Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796

Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796


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Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796

Retreat to the Rhine
The Terrain
Austrian Positions and Plans
The French Plan
The Battle
20 October

The battle of Emmendingen (19 October 1796) was an Austrian victory that removed any chance that General Moreau's Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle might have been able to retain a foothold on the eastern bank of the Rhine at the end of his retreat from southern Germany.

In the summer of 1796 the French had launched a two-pronged invasion of Germany. Moreau reached the outskirts of Munich before he discovered that Jourdan had been defeated at Amberg and Würzburg and was retreating back to the Rhine. Moreau began a slow retreat back to the west, with an Austrian army under General Latour following close behind. Moreau was not yet ready to abandon his campaign completely, and on 2 October turned back and inflicted a costly defeat on Latour at Biberach, but the Archduke Charles was now beginning to threaten his rear, and Moreau was forced to continue his retreat.

Retreat to the Rhine

On the day after the victory at Biberach, Moreau was still in a potentially dangerous position. The Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle was eighty miles east of the relative safety of the Rhine valley, on the southern banks of the Danube. To reach the Rhine they would have to cross two mountain ranges – the Alb and the Black Forest. Latour's army had been beaten at Biberach, but not destroyed, and was still following their retreat. Generals Nauendorf and Petrasch had joined up at Hechingen, on the northern slopes of the Alb. The Austrians also had troops just to the north of Strasbourg on the eastern banks of the Rhine, and the final defeat of Jourdan's army at Altenkirchen (19 September) had freed the Archduke Charles to move south with reinforcements.

Moreau had been hoping to cross the Black Forest using the Kinzig valley, which would have brought him out onto into the Rhine valley close to Strasbourg, but this route was now closed to him. Instead he decided to use the Höllental. This valley crosses one of the highest sections of the Black Forest, twenty miles north of the Swiss border, running from Hinterzarten in the east to Kirchzarten and Buchenbach in the middle of the mountains. A wider valley then runs west to Freiburg im Breisgau, at the edge of the Rhine plains.

This route soon left the army rather stretched out. While the bulk of the army moved to Riedlingen, ten miles to the west of Biberach on the Danube, the advance guard crossed the Alb and captured Villengen and Rothweit, towards the southern end of the gap between the Alb and the Black Forest. The left wing of the army followed them across, and took up a position at Rothweit, facing north to guard against any move by Nauendorf. The right wing of the army moved to Tuttlingen, at the southern end of the Alb, and turned east to face Latour.

The centre of the army, under Saint-Cyr, forced the passage of the Höllental. The two Austrian battalions guarding the pass, under the command of Colonel Aspres, were forced to retreat out of the valley and to Emmendingen, six miles to the north of Freiburg im Breisgau. Saint Cyr entered Freiburg on 12 October, and the rest of the army followed across the pass on the next few days. The heavier equipment took a more southerly route, and made for Huningue, almost on the Swiss border, protected by Tharreau's and Paillard's brigades, who fought a number of minor rearguard actions against General Froelich's light troops.

Moreau's next objective was to open communications with the fortified camp at Kehl, opposite Strasbourg, where he had first crossed the Rhine back in June. Rather than re-cross the Rhine and advance up the French held west bank to Strasbourg, he decided to fight his way up the east bank.

The Terrain

The battle of Emmendingen took place in the Elz valley. This valley zigzags its way through the Black Forest before emerging onto the Rhine plain north of Freiburg in Breisgau. The section of the valley involved in the battle runs south-west through the mountains from Elzach, through Bleibach and Waldkirch. Just to the south west of Waldkirch the river emerges from the mountains and turns to the right, flowing north-west towards the Rhine, with the Black Forest to its right. This section of the river passes through Emmendingen and reaches Riegel. In 1796 the river turned north at Riegel and ran parallel to the Black Forest until it reached the Rhine some way to the north. Riegel sits in a narrow gap between the Black Forest and an isolated outcropping of volcanic hills known as the Kaiserstuhl.

Austrian Positions and Plans

Moreau's chances of success in this venture got worse with every day that passed. On 15 October the Archduke Charles reached Offenburg, fifteen miles to the south east of Kehl, where he joined up with Petrasch and Nauenbourg's left wing. Latour emerged from the Kinzig valley on 17 October, and on 18 October reached the camp of Mahlberg, fifteen miles further south. Condé and Froelich were at Neustadt, at the east end of the Höllental, and General Wolf was a little further south, at Waldshut. The Archduke originally wanted to launch an attack on the French on 18 October, but Latour's men needed a day to recover from their march, and so the attack was postponed until the following day.

The Archduke split his army into four columns. General Nauendorff was in the upper Elz valley with 6,000 men (8 battalions and 14 squadrons). He was to advance south west towards Waldkirch.

Feldzeugmeister Wilhelm Graf Wartensleben, with 8,500 men (12 battalions and 23 squadrons) was to advance south across the foothills of the Black Forest and capture the Elz bridge at Emmendingen.

General Latour, with 6,000 men (8 battalions and 15 squadrons) was also to cross the foothills of the Black Forest via Heimbach and Malterdingen (east of Riegel) and capture the bridge of Köndringen, half way between Riegel and Emmendingen.

General Karl Alois, Prince of Fürstenberg, held Kenzingen, 2-3 miles to the north of Riegel on the original course of the Elz. He was ordered to make demonstrations against Riegel and to protect Rust, Kappel and Grafenhausen, to the north of the main Austrian position.

Further south General Froelich and the Prince of Condé were to pin down General Ferino and the French right in the Stieg valley.

The French Plan

Moreau's plan of attack was an almost exact mirror image of the Austrian plan. General Delmas was to attack Riegel, where he would clash with the Prince of Fürstenberg.

General Beauput was to occupy the heights of Malterdingen (3 miles to the north-west of Emmendingen) and Kondringen. He would face Latour's column.

The first division of the centre was to hold Emmendingen, where it would be attacked by Wartensleben.

Saint-Cyr, with the second division of the centre, was to attack north-east up the Elz valley towards Bleibach, where he would run head first into Nauendorff.

The attack would only involve the centre of his army, for General Desaix with the left wing was to the south, while General Ferino, with the right, was guarding the passes across the Black Forest. As a result the Moreau was outnumbered by the Archduke, even though only about 20,000 Austrians were involved in the attack.

The Battle

The fighting in the mountains went the way of the Austrians. At dawn Saint-Cyr began to advance up the Elz valley, while Nauendorf prepared to move down the valley. Saint-Cyr decided to send a second small column across the mountains to the east of the valley, aiming for the village of Simonswald, located in a side valley. He hoped that this force would hit Nauendorf's left, and force him to withdraw from Bleibach. Unfortunately for the French Nauendorf had posted flankers on the heights alongside the Elz valley and Saint-Cyr's men were ambushed by Austrian riflemen. On the other side of the Elz valley more Austrian riflemen reached a dominating position at Kolnau, which overlooked Waldkirch. Saint-Cyr was forced to cancel the advance on Bleibach and withdrew to Waldkirch. Nauendorf continued to push him, and Saint-Cyr was forced to retreat another two miles to Denzlingen.

At about midday Latour's two columns attacked Beaupuy at Matterdingen. Beaupuy was killed early in the fighting and in the confusion this caused his division didn't receive an order to retreat along the Elz to Wasser, south of Emmendingen.

Wartensleben, in the Austrian centre, took all day to fight his way to Emmendingen. Two of his columns were held up by French riflemen posted in the wood of Landeck held, two miles to the north of Emmendingen, and he himself was badly wounded. The French were eventually forced to retreat late in the day when Wartensleben's third column threatened to outflank their right. The French then retreated across the river, destroying the bridges behind them.

At the end of the day Moreau was in a very poor position. Delmas was at Riegel and Endingen, at the north-eastern corner of the Kaiserstuhl. Saint-Cyr's right was behind Denzlingen, and his left at Unterreute. The French centre was at Nimburg, half way between Riegel and Unterreute. The French line faced north-east towards the Austrians. Over night on 19-20 October the Austrians repaired the bridge at Emmendingen, and by the morning of 20 October the Archduke was camped close to Denzlingen.

20 October

On 20 October Moreau finally abandoned any plans for an advance up the east bank of the Rhine. Desaix was ordered to cross the Rhine at Brisach (at the southern end of the Kaiserstuhl, and ten miles west of Freiburg) and advance north towards Strasbourg and Kehl.

The French centre withdrew from its most advanced positions, and took up a new position behind the Dresiam (the stream that runs from Freiburg north to Riegel). Ferino, with the right wing of the army, was still in the valley of Saint-Pierre, and if the French lost Freiburg he would be trapped between Condé and Froelich in the valley and the Archduke on the plains.

The French held out along the Dresiam just long enough to allow Ferino to reach safety. Condé and Froelich were close behind, and when they opened fire on the French right in Freiburg Saint-Cyr was finally forced to retreat. Further to the north-west Latour fought his way across the Dresiam on his fourth attempt, and the Prince of Fürstenburg captured Riegel.

The French retreated around the heights of Pfaffenweiler, and then pulled back towards the bridge at Huningue, close to Basle. On 22 October Moreau reached Schliengen, ten miles to the north of Huningue, and decided to make a stand to cover his retreat across the river.

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Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796 - History

At the Battle of Emmendingen, on 19 October 1796, the French Army of Rhin-et-Moselle under Jean Victor Marie Moreau fought the First Coalition Army of the Upper Rhine commanded by Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen. Emmendingen is located on the Elz River in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, north of Freiburg im Breisgau. The action occurred during the War of the First Coalition, the first phase of the larger French Revolutionary Wars. After a summer of parrying between the two sides, the French were already withdrawing through the Black Forest to the Rhine. In close pursuit, the Austrians forced the French commander to split his force so he could cross the Rhine at three points via the bridges at Kehl, Breisach, and Hüningen. By mid-September, though, the Austrians controlled the approaches to the crossings at Breisach and Kehl. Moreau still wanted half his army to approach the Austrians at Kehl. The rugged terrain at Emmendingen complicated fighting, making it possible for the Habsburg force to snipe at the French troops, and to block any passage toward Kehl rainy and cold weather further hampered the efforts of both sides, turning streams and rivulets into rushing torrents of water, and making roadways slippery. The fighting was fierce two generals died in the battle, one from each side. Habsburg success at Emmendingen forced the French to abandon their plans for a three-pronged, or even a two-pronged, withdrawal. The French continued their retreat through the Black Forest mountain towns to the south, where the armies fought the Battle of Schliengen five days later.

Initially, the rulers of Europe viewed the French Revolution as a dispute between the French king and his subjects, and not something in which they should interfere. As revolutionary rhetoric grew more strident, they declared the interest of the monarchs of Europe as one with the interests of Louis XVI and his family this Declaration of Pillnitz (27 August 1791) threatened ambiguous, but quite serious, consequences if anything should happen to the royal family. The position of the revolutionaries became increasingly difficult. Compounding their problems in international relations, French émigrés continued to agitate for support of a counter-revolution. Finally, on 20 April 1792, the French National Convention declared war on Austria. In this War of the First Coalition (1792–1798), France ranged itself against most of the European states sharing land or water borders with her, plus Portugal and the Ottoman Empire. Timothy Blanning. ''The French Revolutionary Wars'', New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 41–59. Despite some victories in 1792, by early 1793, France was in crisis: French forces had been pushed out of Belgium, the French king had just been executed, and there was revolt in the Vendée over conscription and wide-spread resentment of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The armies of the French Republic were in a state of disruption the problems became even more acute following the introduction of mass conscription, the ''levée en masse'', which saturated an already distressed army with thousands of illiterate, untrained men. For the French, the Rhine Campaign of 1795 proved especially disastrous, although they had achieved some success in other theaters of war, including the War of the Pyrenees (1793–1795). The armies of the First Coalition included the imperial contingents and the infantry and cavalry of the various states, amounting to about 125,000 (including three autonomous corps), a sizable force by eighteenth century standards but a moderate force by the standards of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. In total, the commander-in-chief Archduke Charles' troops stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea and Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser's, from the Swiss-Italian border to the Adriatic. Habsburg troops comprised the bulk of the army, but the "thin white line" Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815)". ''Military Affairs'', 37:1 (Feb 1973), pp 1&ndash5, p. 2 quoted. of Coalition infantry could not cover the territory from Basel to Frankfurt with sufficient depth to resist the pressure of their opponents. Compared to French coverage, Charles had half the number of troops to cover a front that stretched from Renchen near Basel to Bingen. Furthermore, he had concentrated the bulk of his force, commanded by Count Baillet Latour, between Karlsruhe and Darmstadt, where the confluence of the Rhine and the Main made an attack most likely the rivers offered a gateway into eastern German states and ultimately to Vienna, with good bridges crossing a relatively well-defined river bank. To his north, Wilhelm von Wartensleben's autonomous corps covered the line between Mainz and Giessen. The Austrian army consisted of professionals, many brought from the border regions in the Balkans, and conscripts drafted from the Imperial Circles.

Resumption of fighting: 1796

In January 1796, the French and the members of the First Coalition called a truce, ending the Rhine Campaign of 1795 they understood it was temporary. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, ''Warfare in the Age of Napoleon: The Revolutionary Wars Against the First Coalition in Northern Europe and the Italian Campaign, 1789–1797.'' Leonaur, 2011. pp. 286–287 Blanning, pp. 41–59. This agreement lasted until 20 May 1796, when the Austrians announced that it would end on 31 May. The Coalition's Army of the Lower Rhine included 90,000 troops, mostly Habsburg and ''Reichsarmee'' (Imperial) troops mustered from the states of the Holy Roman Empire. The 20,000-man right wing under Duke Ferdinand Frederick Augustus of Württemberg stood on the east bank of the Rhine behind the Sieg River, observing the French bridgehead at Düsseldorf. The garrisons of Mainz Fortress and Ehrenbreitstein Fortress counted 10,000 more. Charles posted the remainder of the Habsburg and Coalition force on the west bank behind the Nahe. Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser led the 80,000-strong Army of the Upper Rhine. Its right wing occupied Kaiserslautern on the west bank, and the left wing under Anton Sztáray, Michael von Fröhlich and Louis Joseph, Prince of Condé guarded the Rhine from Mannheim to Switzerland. The original Coalition strategy was to capture Trier and to use the position on the west bank to strike at each of the French armies in turn. However, news arrived in Vienna of Bonaparte's successes. Reconsidering the situation, the Aulic Council gave Archduke Charles command over both Austrian armies and ordered him to hold his ground and sent Wurmser to Italy with 25,000 reinforcements. The loss of Wurmser and his troops weakened the Coalition force considerably. On the French side, the 80,000-man Army of Sambre-et-Meuse held the west bank of the Rhine down to the Nahe and then southwest to Sankt Wendel. On the army's left flank, Jean-Baptiste Kléber had 22,000 troops in an entrenched camp at Düsseldorf. The right wing of the Army of Rhin-et-Moselle was positioned behind the Rhine from Hüningen northward, its center was along the Queich River near Landau and its left wing extended west toward Saarbrücken. Pierre Marie Barthélemy Ferino led Moreau's right wing, Louis Desaix commanded the center and Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr directed the left wing. Ferino's wing consisted of three infantry and cavalry divisions under François Antoine Louis Bourcier and Henri François Delaborde. Desaix's command counted three divisions led by Michel de Beaupuy, Antoine Guillaume Delmas and Charles Antoine Xaintrailles. Saint-Cyr's wing had two divisions commanded by Guillaume Philibert Duhesme, and Taponier. The French grand plan called for two French armies to press against the flanks of the northern armies in the German states while simultaneously a third army approached Vienna through Italy. Jourdan's army would push southeast from Düsseldorf, intending to draw troops and attention toward themselves, which would allow Moreau's army an easier crossing of the Rhine between Kehl and Hüningen. According to plan, Jourdan’s army feinted toward Mannheim, and Charles quickly reapportioned his troops. Moreau's army attacked the bridgehead at Kehl, which was guarded by 7,000 imperial troops—troops recruited that spring from the Swabian circle polities, inexperienced and untrained—which amazingly held the bridgehead for several hours, but then retreated toward Rastatt. On June 23–24, Moreau reinforced the bridgehead with his forward guard. After pushing the imperial militia from their post on the bridgehead, his troops poured into Baden unhindered. Similarly, in the south, by Basel, Ferino’s column moved speedily across the river and proceeded up the Rhine along the Swiss and German shoreline, toward Lake Constance and into the southern end of the Black Forest. Anxious that his supply lines would be overextended, Charles began a retreat to the east. At this point, the inherent jealousies and competition between generals came into play. Moreau could have joined up with Jourdan’s army in the north, but did not he proceeded eastward, pushing Charles into Bavaria. Jourdan also moved eastward, pushing Wartensleben’s autonomous corps into the Ernestine duchies, and neither general seemed willing to unite his flank with his compatriot's. Dodge, pp. 292–293. There followed a summer of strategic retreats, flanking, and reflanking maneuvers. On either side, the union of two armies—Wartensleben's with Charles' or Jourdan's with Moreau's—could have crushed the opposition. Dodge, pp. 297. Wartensleben and Charles united first, and the tide turned against the French. With 25,000 of his best troops, the Archduke crossed to the north bank of the Danube at Regensburg and moved north to join his colleague Wartensleben. The defeat of Jourdan's army at the battles of Amberg, Würzburg and Altenkirchen allowed Charles to move more troops to the south. The next contact occurred on 19 October at Emmendingen. J. Rickard
''Battle of Emmendingen''
History of War
17 February 2009. Accessed 18 November 2014.

Emmendingen lies in the Elz valley, which winds through the Black Forest. The Elz creates a series of hanging valleys which challenge the passage of large bodies of troops the rainy weather further complicated the passage through the Elz valley. The area around Riegel am Kaiserstuhl is noted for its loess and narrow transition points, which greatly influenced the battle.

The better part of the French army debouched through the Höll valley. Desaix's left wing included the nine battalions and 12 squadrons of the Division St. Suzanne by Riegel, straddling both shores of the Elz. To the right, between Malterdingen and Emmendingen, Beaupuy commanded a division of 12 battalions and 12 squadrons. Further to the right, by Emmendingen itself, and in the heights by Heimbach, stood Saint-Cyr around this stretched the Duhesme's Division (12 battalions and eight squadrons). Further to the right of these, in the Elz valley by Waldkirch stood Ambert's division and the Girard brigade by Zähringen, about a mile away, Lecourbe's brigade stood in reserve, and, stretching northward from there, a mounted division of 14,000 roamed the vicinity of Holzhausen (nowadays part of March, Breisgau). These positions created a line about long. On the far side of Lecorbe's brigade stood Ferino's 15 battalions and 16 squadrons, but these were well to the south and east of Freiburg im Breisgau, still tramping through the mountains. Everyone had been hampered by heavy rains the ground was soft and slippery, and both the Rhine and Elz rivers had flooded, as had the many tributaries. This increased the hazards of mounted attack, because the horses could not get a good footing. Johann Samuel Ersch
''Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889, pp. 64–66. Against this stood the Archduke's force. Upon reaching a few miles of Emmendingen, the Archduke split his force into four columns. Column Nauendorf, in the upper Elz, had eight battalions and 14 squadrons, advancing southwest to Waldkirch Wartensleben had 12 battalions and 23 squadrons advancing south to capture the Elz bridge at Emmendingen. Latour, with 6,000 men, was to cross the foothills via Heimbach and Malterdingen, and capture the bridge of Köndringen, between Riegel and Emmendingen, and column Fürstenberg held Kinzingen, about north of Riegel. Frölich and Condé (part of Nauendorf's column) were instructed to pin down Ferino and the French right wing in the Stieg valley.

The first to arrive at Emmindingen, the French secured the high point at Waldkirch, which commanded the neighboring valleys it was considered, at the time, a maxim of military tactics, that command of the mountains gave control of the valleys. By 19 October, the armies faced each other, on the banks of the Elz from Waldkirch to Emmendingen. By then, Moreau knew he could not proceed to Kehl along the right bank of the Rhine, so he decided to cross the Rhine further north, at Breisach. The bridge there was small, though, and his whole army could not pass over without causing a bottleneck, so he sent only the left wing, commanded by Desaix, to cross there. Archibald Alison (Sir Archibald Alison, 1st Baronet) ''History of Europe,'' ondon W. Blackwood and Sons, 1835, pp. 86&ndash90. At dawn, Saint-Cyr (French right) advanced along the Elz valley. Nauendorf prepared to move his Habsburg forces down the valley. Seeing this, Saint-Cyr sent a small column across the mountains to the east of the main valley, to the village of Simonswald, located in a side valley. He instructed them to attack Nauendorf's left, and to force him to withdraw from Bleibach. Anticipating this, though, Nauendorf had already posted units on the heights along the Elz valley, from which Austrian shooters ambushed Saint-Cyr's men. On the other side of the Elz valley, more Habsburg gunmen reached Kollnau, which overlooked Waldkirch, and from there they could fire down on the French force. The fighting was swift and furious. The superior Austrian positions forced Saint-Cyr to cancel his advance on Bleibach and withdraw to Waldkirch even there, though, Nauendorf's men continued to harass him, and Saint-Cyr retreated another to the relative safety of Denzlingen. The fighting went no better for the French on their left. Decaen's advanced guard proceeded forward, albeit cautiously. Austrian marksmen fired down upon the column, and Decaen fell from his horse, injured. Beaupuy took Decaen's place with the advance guard. Phipps, Vol. II, pp. 380&ndash385. At midday, Latour abandoned his customary caution and sent two columns to attack Beaupuy between Malterdingen and Höllental (Val d'Enfer), resulting in a fierce firefight. After giving an order to retreat along the Elz, Beaupuy was killed and his division did not receive an order to retreat, causing additional losses for the French. In the center, French riflemen posted in the Landeck wood, north of Emmendingen, held up two of Wartensleben's detachments while his third struggled over muddy, nearly impassable, roads. Wartensleben's men needed all day to fight their way to Emmendingen, and during the shooting, Wartensleben's left arm was shattered by a musket ball. Finally, late in the day, Wartensleben's third column arrived and threatened to outflank the French right the French retreated across the Elz river, destroying the bridges behind them. Alison, pp. 86&ndash90 Phipps, Vol. II, p. 278. At the close of the day's fighting, Moreau's force stood in a precarious position. Left to right, the French were stretched along a jagged, broken line of about . Decaen's division stood at Riegel and Endingen, at the north-eastern corner of the Kaiserstuhl, no longer of any assistance to the bulk of Moreau's force Moreau had also lost an energetic and promising officer in Beaupuy. On the right, Saint-Cyr's division stood behind Denzlingen, and the left stretched to Unterreute, a thin line also separated from the center, at Nimburg (near Tenningen and Landeck), half way between Riegel and Unterreute. The French line faced north-east towards the Austrians despite Habsburg successes throughout the day, the Coalition forces were unable to flank the French line, and the French consequently were able to withdraw in reasonably good order to the south.

Notes, citations and alphabetical listing of resources

Alphabetical listing of resources

* Alison, Archibald (Sir Archibald Alison, 1st Baron). ''History of Europe.'' London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1835. *Blanning, Timothy. ''The French Revolutionary Wars.'' New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, * Charles, Archduke of Austria
''Ausgewählte Schriften weiland seiner kaiserlichen Hoheit des Erzherzogs Carl von Österreich.''
Vienna, W. Braumüller, 1893–94. . * Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. ''Warfare in the Age of Napoleon: The Revolutionary Wars Against the First Coalition in Northern Europe and the Italian Campaign, 1789–1797.'' Leonaur, 2011. . * Dupuy, Roger. ''La période jacobine: terreur, guerre et gouvernement révolutionnaire: 1792&ndash1794'', Paris, Seuil, 2005. * Ersch, Johann Samuel
''Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889. *Gates, David. '' The Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815,'' New York, Random House, 2011. *Graham, Thomas, Baron Lynedoch
''The History of the Campaign of 1796 in Germany and Italy.''
London, 1797. . * Haythornthwaite, Philip. ''Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (1): Infantry.'' Osprey Publishing, 2012. * Huot, Paul. ''Des Vosges au Rhin, excursions et causeries alsaciennes,'' Veuve Berger-Levrault & Fils, Paris, 1868. * Phipps, Ramsay Weston. ''The Armies of the First French Republic: Volume II The Armées du Moselle, du Rhin, de Sambre-et-Meuse, de Rhin-et-Moselle''. US: Pickle Partners Publishing 2011 reprint of original publication 1920–32. * Rickard, J
''Battle of Emmendingen''
History of War
17 February 2009. Accessed 18 November 2014. *Rothenburg, Gunther. "The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815)". ''Military Affairs,'' 37:1 (Feb 1973), pp. 1–5. *Schroeder, Paul W. ''Transformation of Europe, 1763–1848'', Clarendon, 1996, chapters 2–3. * Smith, Digby. ''Napoleonic Wars Data Book.'' Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1999. * Wurzbach, Constant von. ''Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich'' 53. Vienna, 1886. *Vann, James Allen. ''The Swabian Kreis: Institutional Growth in the Holy Roman Empire 1648–1715.'' Vol. LII, Studies Presented to International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions. Bruxelles, 1975. *Walker, Mack. ''German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648–1871.'' Ithaca, 1998. <

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Americans defeat the British at Yorktown

Hopelessly trapped at Yorktown, Virginia, British General Lord Cornwallis surrenders 8,000 British soldiers and seamen to a larger Franco-American force, effectively bringing an end to the American Revolution.

Lord Cornwallis was one of the most capable British generals of the American Revolution. In 1776, he drove General George Washington’s Patriots forces out of New Jersey, and in 1780 he won a stunning victory over General Horatio Gates’ Patriot army at Camden, South Carolina. Cornwallis’ subsequent invasion of North Carolina was less successful, however, and in April 1781 he led his weary and battered troops toward the Virginia coast, where he could maintain seaborne lines of communication with the large British army of General Henry Clinton in New York City. After conducting a series of raids against towns and plantations in Virginia, Cornwallis settled in the tidewater town of Yorktown in August. The British immediately began fortifying the town and the adjacent promontory of Gloucester Point across the York River.

General George Washington instructed the Marquis de Lafayette, who was in Virginia with an American army of around 5,000 men, to block Cornwallis’ escape from Yorktown by land. In the meantime, Washington’s 2,500 troops in New York were joined by a French army of 4,000 men under the Count de Rochambeau. Washington and Rochambeau made plans to attack Cornwallis with the assistance of a large French fleet under the Count de Grasse, and on August 21 they crossed the Hudson River to march south to Yorktown. Covering 200 miles in 15 days, the allied force reached the head of Chesapeake Bay in early September.

Meanwhile, a British fleet under Admiral Thomas Graves failed to break French naval superiority at the Battle of Virginia Capes on September 5, denying Cornwallis his expected reinforcements. Beginning September 14, de Grasse transported Washington and Rochambeau’s men down the Chesapeake to Virginia, where they joined Lafayette and completed the encirclement of Yorktown on September 28. De Grasse landed another 3,000 French troops carried by his fleet. During the first two weeks of October, the 14,000 Franco-American troops gradually overcame the fortified British positions with the aid of de Grasse’s warships. A large British fleet carrying 7,000 men set out to rescue Cornwallis, but it was too late.

On October 19, General Cornwallis surrendered 7,087 officers and men, 900 seamen, 144 cannons, 15 galleys, a frigate, and 30 transport ships. Pleading illness, he did not attend the surrender ceremony, but his second-in-command, General Charles O’Hara, carried Cornwallis’ sword to the American and French commanders. As the British and Hessian troops marched out to surrender, the British bands played the song “The World Turned Upside Down.”

Although the war persisted on the high seas and in other theaters, the Patriot victory at Yorktown effectively ended fighting in the American colonies. Peace negotiations began in 1782, and on September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed, formally recognizing the United States as a free and independent nation after eight years of war.


Stock markets have the largest-ever one-day crash on "Black Monday"

The largest-ever one-day percentage decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average comes not in 1929 but on October 19, 1987. As a number of unrelated events conspired to tank global markets, the Dow dropped 508 points�.6 percent—in a panic that foreshadowed larger systemic issues.

Confidence on Wall Street had grown throughout the 1980s as the economy pulled out of a slump and President Ronald Reagan implemented business-friendly policies. In October 1987, however, indicators began to suggest that the bull market of the last five years was coming to an end. The government reported a surprisingly large trade deficit, precipitating a decline in the U.S. Dollar. Congress revealed it was considering closing tax loopholes for corporate mergers, worrying investors who were used to loose regulation.

As these concerns grew, Iran attacked two oil tankers off of Kuwait and a freak storm paralyzed England, closing British markets early on the Friday before the crash. The following Monday, U.S. investors awoke to news of turmoil in Asian and European markets, and the Dow began to tumble.

Further compounding the crash was the practice of program trading, the programming of computers to automatically execute trades under certain conditions. Once the rush to sell began, matters were quite literally out of traders’ hands and machines escalated the damage to the market.

Despite looking like the beginning of another Great Depression—the L.A. Times’ headline read �lam on Wall St.” while the New York Daily News’ simply read “PANIC!,” Black Monday has been largely forgotten by Americans not versed in financial history. As it would again in 2008, the federal government took a number of measures to 𠇌orrect” the market, resulting in immediate gains over the next few weeks. By 1989, the market appeared to have made a full recovery. 

Some now interpret the events surrounding Black Monday as proof that boom-and-bust cycles are natural and healthy aspects of modern economics, while others believe it was a missed opportunity to examine and regulate the kind of risky behaviors that led to the crash of 2008.


“Take on Me” music video helps Norway’s A-ha reach the top the U.S. pop charts

From its beginnings in the early 1980s, it was clear that MTV, the Music Television Network, would have a dramatic effect on the way pop stars marketed their music and themselves. While radio remained a necessary engine to drive the sales and chart rankings of singles and albums, the rise of new artists like Duran Duran and the further ascent of established stars like Michael Jackson showed that creativity and esthetic appeal on MTV could make a direct and undeniable contribution to a musical performer’s commercial success. But if ever a case existed in which MTV did more than just contribute to an act’s success, it was the case of the Norwegian band a-Ha, who went from total unknowns to chart-topping pop stars almost solely on the strength of the groundbreaking video for the song “Take On Me,” which hit #1 on the Billboard pop chart on October 19, 1985.

By 1985 the medium was established enough that it took a unique angle to achieve music video stardom. Enter a-Ha, a synth-pop group that caught a late ride on the dying New Wave thanks to the video for “Take On Me,” in which lead singer Morten Harket was transformed using a decades-old technology called Rotoscoping. The creators of the “Take On Me” video painted portions or sometimes the entirety of individual frames to create the effect of a dashingly handsome comic-book motorcycle racer (Harket) romancing a pretty girl from the real world, fighting off a gang of angry pursuers in a pipe-wrench fight before bursting out of the comic-book world as a dashingly handsome real boy.


A Forgotten Army The Irish Yeomanry

‘Peep O’Day Boys’, from Daly’s Ireland in 󈨦(1888). Despite the title the uniforms suggest that villians in the picture are Yeomanry, a reflection of their notoriety in folk memory.

In September 1796, Ireland was pregnant with expectation. The United Irishmen and Defenders planned insurrection and a French invasion was imminent. On 19 September Dublin Castle announced plans to follow Britain’s lead and enlist civilian volunteers as a yeomanry force. In October commissions were issued to local gentlemen and magistrates empowering them to raise cavalry troops and infantry companies. Recruits took the ‘Yeomanry oath’, were officered by the local gentry but were paid, clothed, armed and controlled by government. Their remit was to free the regular army and militia from domestic peacekeeping and do garrison duty if invasion meant troops had to move
to the coast. Service was part-time—usually two ‘exercise days’ per week—except during emergencies when they were called up on ‘permanent duty’.

Folk memory

If the Irish Yeomanry are remembered at all it is usually for their notoriety in the bloody summer of 1798. The popular folk memory of every area which saw action supplies lurid stories from the burning of Father John Murphy’s corpse in a tar barrel at Tullow to the sabreing and mutilation of Betsy Gray after the battle of Ballynahinch. Until recently, the Yeomen have been largely written out of history, apart from early nineteenth century polemics where they appear either as a brutal mob making ‘croppies’ lie down or latter day Williamite saviours. Such neglect belies the Irish Yeomanry’s real significance.
When Belfast’s White Linen Hall was demolished in 1896 to make way for City Hall a glass phial containing a scroll bearing Volunteer reform resolutions was found in its foundations. Two years later another demolition occurred. Ballynahinch loyalists smashed the monument on Betsy Gray’s grave to prevent a 1798 centenary celebration by Belfast Home Rulers. Volunteer radicalism was hermetically sealed in the past while the passions and polarisation engendered in the later 1790s lived and breathed. The Irish Yeomanry played a key role in this critical transition which saw ancient antipathies sharpen and re-assert their baleful influence after a period of relative calm. The ‘Age of Reason’ had briefly promised a brave new world in Ireland. In the 1780s, radical Volunteers favoured Catholic relief along with parliamentary reform. The Boyne Societies, founded to perpetuate the Williamite cause, charged toasting glasses rather than muskets. However the prospect of revolutionary change proved too much to swallow.

Flag of the Lower lveagh Yeoman Cavalry.
(Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

The force raised in 1796 actually bore much more resemblance to the Volunteers, praised by United Irish writers Myles Byrne and Charles Teeling, than to the reactionary and bigoted organisation portrayed in their rebellion histories. In reality, loyalism in 1796 was still a relatively broad church containing an ideological diversity and fluidity reminiscent of Volunteering days. Indeed, the Yeomanry were largely based on the same membership constituency, with frequent continuity of individual or family service. They certainly included the Williamite tradition found in some Volunteer corps but it also encompassed much of the democratic and indeed radical volunteering spirit. Election of officers was common everywhere. Dublin Yeomen, whom Henry Joy McCracken thought ‘liberal’, also elected their captains despite governmental opposition. Even in Armagh, the cockpit of Orangeism, Yeomen varied from Diamond veterans in the Crowhill infantry to radical ex-Volunteers enrolled by Lord Charlemont despite quibbles over the oath and the inclusion of some erstwhile francophiles who had recently erected a liberty tree.
In 1796, there was no inconsistency about this. Grattan dubbed the Yeomanry ‘an ascendancy army’ but in reality the United Irishmen were in the ascendant while the loyalist response was fragmented and in danger of being overwhelmed. The initial priority was defence: to trawl in all varieties of loyalty and provide a structure to prevent people being neutralised or becoming United Irishmen.

More Catholics than Orangemen

The new Yeomanry was therefore a surprisingly diverse force, given its subsequent reputation. The government denied any intention of excluding Catholics or Presbyterians but the system already had the potential for denominational

and ideological filtering. Being a Yeoman was a desirable position conveying social status plus pay, clothing, arms and training. Applications exceeded places, which were limited by financial and security considerations. This meant selection locally and government reliance on local landowners’ judgement.
Sometimes recruits had no choice. In some areas only Protestants volunteered, in others the Catholic Committee sabotaged Catholic enlistment. In Loughinsholin, where Presbyterians offered Catholics withdrew and vice-versa. Where there was competition to enter a limited number of corps, choices were unavoidable. Downshire allowed Catholics in his cavalry but faced mutually exclusive Protestant and Catholic infantry offers from the same parishes and opted for the former. In Orange areas, some landowners deliberately selected their Yeomen directly from the local lodge. Occasionally a precarious balance was attempted by including proportions of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. The Farney corps in Monaghan started this way. However the first levy produced a predominantly Anglican force. There were Presbyterian Yeomen in mid-Ulster but the strength of the United Irishmen in eastern counties meant relatively few corps were raised there in 1796.
Wealthy, property-owning Catholics, on the other hand, were admitted into cavalry corps. There was an element of tokenism in this: Yeomanry offers of service sometimes highlighted Catholic members, which they never did for the Protestant denominations. In this way it can be estimated that at the very least ten per cent of the first national levy of 20,000 Yeomen were Catholic, thus outnumbering the Orange yeomen who in 1796 were only to be found in some corps in the Orange districts of mid-Ulster.
Forming a Yeomanry force in the deteriorating conditions of 1796 gave the initiative briefly back to Dublin Castle but this disappeared in the crisis following the Bantry Bay invasion attempt. The United Irishmen drew great encouragement from its near success and felt themselves strong enough to switch their policy on the Yeomanry from intimidation to infiltration. As a response, purges of Yeomanry corps began in Ulster and Leinster in the spring of 1797.

Orange links

Many Catholics were expelled from corps in Wicklow and Wexford on suspicion of being ‘United’. In mid-Ulster General John Knox devised a ‘test oath’ obliging Yeomen to publicly swear they were not United Irishmen. This got results and several corps were cleared of disaffected members. The Presbyterian secretary of the Farney corps was expelled following his confession of United Irish membership while Catholics were removed on the pretext of a political resolution they had issued. Knox followed up the expulsions by permitting augmentations of Orangemen into some northern corps. Although Orangemen quietly joined some corps in 1796 this was the first time they had official approval.
Knox clinched this by engineering Orange resolutions for Castle consumption. This was a risky strategy, given the recent disturbances in Armagh. Knox, a correspondent of the radical MP Arthur O’Connor, privately disapproved of Orangeism but believed the dangerous predicament he faced merited utilising it as a short-term expedient. However, with the United Irish-Defender alliance growing, the precedent inherent in this strategy would have profound and lasting consequences. Almost immediately, symptoms of polarisation appeared. A Tyrone clergyman noted approvingly, ‘Our parties are all obviously merged into two: loyalists and traitors’.

Castlereagh’s secret policy

However the critical Yeomanry-Orange connection was still to come. By 1798 Orangeism had been adopted by many northern gentry and spread to Dublin where a framework national organisation was established. As insurrection loomed, this provided a ready-made supply of loyal manpower. There were around 18,000 Yeomen in Ulster whereas the Orangemen were conservatively reckoned at 40,000. In March the Dublin leaders offered the Ulster Orangemen to the government if it would arm them. The viceroy, Camden, was scared of offending Catholics in the Militia and hestitated. However, the appointment of an Irishman—Lord Castlereagh—as acting chief secretary offered a solution. On 16 April 1798 he ordered northern Yeomanry commanders to organise 5,000 ‘supplementary’ men to be armed in an emergency. Camden and Castlereagh had privately decided that, where possible, these would be Orangemen.
In tandem with the supplementary plan, regular Yeomen were given a more military role. They were put on permanent duty and integrated into contingency plans for garrisoning key towns at the outbreak of trouble. This had one very important side-effect. In the cramped conditions of garrison life and the panic occasioned by the influx of rural loyalists, Orangeism spread like wildfire amongst both Yeomanry and regular units. This spontaneous, ground-level spread of Orangeism operated simultaneously with Castlereagh’s secret emergency policy to utilise Orange manpower in Ulster. The Yeomanry system proved the ideal facilitator for both.

Drum of the Aughnahoe[County Tyrone] Yeoman Infantry. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

On 1 July 1798 in the Presbyterian town of Belfast, once the epicentre of United Irish activity, it was noted that ‘Every man…has a red coat on’. This would have been inconceivable in 1796 when there was great difficulty enlisting Yeomen. However, it was now government policy to separate northern Presbyterians from the United Irishmen. Again the Yeomanry played a key role. Castlereagh admitted privately that the arrest of the Down United colonel, William Steel Dickson was an exception to ‘the policy of acting against the Catholick [sic] rather than the Presbyterian members of the union [United Irishmen]’. Government supporters industriously spread news of the Scullabogue massacre (See HI Autumn 1996) to stir up atavistic fears. The Yeomanry was expanded considerably to meet the emergency and ex-radicals were no longer discouraged. In effect, the Yeomanry functioned as a safety net. Joining up offered an acceptable and very public ‘way back’ for wavering radicals. Although there were some Presbyterian Yeomen in 1796, many more joined in mid-1798. Charlemont’s friend, the Anglican clergyman Edward Hudson, exploited a ‘schism’ between Presbyterian and Catholic to enlist the former in his Portglenone corps, sardonically noting ‘the brotherhood of affection is over’. By 1799, he claimed ‘the word “Protestant”, which was becoming obsolete in the north, has regained its influence and all of that description seem drawing closer together’. Thus the Yeomanry oath was often a rite of passage for Presbyterians keen to end their flirtation with revolution.

The 1798 rebellion had a profound impact on the psyche of Protestant Ireland, conjuring up anew spectres of 1641. When news of the rising hit Dublin, Camden described the apocalyptic atmosphere to Pitt. The rebellion

literally made the Protestant part of this country mad…it is scarcely possible to restrain the violence of my own immediate friends and advisors…they are prepared for extirpation and any appearance of lenity…raises a flame which runs like wildfire thro’ the streets.

Mercy was indeed scarce until Cornwallis replaced Camden and the rebellion was effectively crushed. Up to this juncture, the interests of most Protestants and the government were running parallel, a partnership potently symbolised by the Yeomanry, now blooded in the rebellion. Many embattled Protestants saw the parallel interests as identical: through the smouldering fires of rebellion they confused expediency with permanent policy.
Cornwallis, a professional soldier, voiced his contempt for the barbarity of the local amateur forces, particularly the Yeomanry. For many, criticism of the Yeomanry was construed as attacking Protestant interests. Yeomanry service under Camden and the relationship it represented was now seen as an unalterable ‘gold standard’. When government policy ran counter to perceived Protestant interests, loyalty was qualified with distrust and a feeling of betrayal. Camden was toasted as ‘the father of the Yeomanry’ while Cornwallis was lampooned as ‘Croppywallis’.

Lt. Col. William Blacker, Yeoman and Oraneman
(Dublin University Magazine 1841)

The Yeomanry and the Union

When it emerged that Pitt intended legislative union, antagonism towards Cornwallis sharpened. As union would remove emancipation from Ireland’s control, ultra-Protestant loyalty faced a severe test. Many Yeomen and Orangemen opposed the measure, particularly in Dublin where lawyers and merchants also faced a loss of professional and mercantile status. The Yeomanry, which it was claimed saved Ireland in 1798, were at the cutting edge of the anti-union campaign. A mutiny was threatened in Dublin with Volunteer-type rhetoric, but the bluster of 1782 proved hot air in post-rebellion Ireland. In the last analysis Protestants depended on the Yeomanry and the Yeomen depended on the government. The consequences of disbandment made union seem the lesser evil. Cornwallis rushed reinforcements to Dublin but the bluff had called itself.
Jonah Barrington later claimed the Volunteers were loyal to their country [Ireland] and their king while the Yeomen looked to ‘the king of England and his ministers’. Barrington’s jibe about patriotism was the peevish reaction of an incorrigible anti-unionist, yet a subtle alteration in the nature and focus of loyalty had occurred. The Volunteers’ ‘patriotism’ flourished in an atmosphere where they faced no real internal threat. While many Yeomen opposed the abolition of the Irish parliament, the experience of 1798 made challenging the executive a luxury they could not afford. On the surface, the switch of loyalty from College Green to Dublin Castle seemed relatively smooth: Yeomanry corps quickly adopted the post-1800 union flag in their colours. Yet, alongside this, a new focus of loyalty emerged to co-exist with this sometimes grudging allegiance. The ‘Protestant nationalism’ of 1782 was transformed into a clenching loyalty to the increasingly insecure interests of Irish Protestants.

Politicisation and Protestantism

The Yeomanry soon became a major component in post-union politics, a conduit between government and substantial numbers of Protestants who increasingly saw the force as symbolising the survival of their social and political position. They functioned as a political tool. When Hardwicke, the new viceroy, wanted to send a conciliatory message to nervous Protestants he reviewed the entire Dublin Yeomanry in Phoenix Park, then lavished hospitality on the officers in a banquet afterwards. It was a two-way process: Protestants could use the Yeomanry to put government in their debt. The continuance of war in 1803 meant a large increase in the Yeomanry from 63,000 to around 80,000. Emmet’s rising, coming when this augmentation was on foot, gave Protestants another opportunity to appear indispensable by extending their monopoly of the Yeomanry. The means by which this was accomplished ranged from high-level manoeuvring to parish pump politics.
As a partisan Yeomanry would be viewed in a poor light at Westminster, Hardwicke attempted a balance by considering some purely Catholic corps. However the Louth MP Fortesque threatened impeachment if he proceeded. Even the chief secretary, Wickham, considered Catholic corps ‘unsafe’ as they would inflame loyalist opinion and ‘be not cried but roared out against throughout all Ireland’. At a local level, Arthur Browne, the Prime Sergeant of Limerick, observed that Yeomanry corps in each town he passed on circuit effectively excluded Catholics by submitting prospective recruits to a ballot of existing members. This said, the Protestant monopoly was never total. Catholic Yeomen remained in areas of sparse Protestant settlement like Kerry. Moreover, there was still a scattering of liberal Protestants, usually at officer level, like Lieutenant Barnes of the Armagh Yeomanry. However, the general tendency was clear. When it became known Barnes had signed an emancipation petition, the privates mutinied and flung down their arms.

In the early nineteenth century, the passions generated by 1798 mixed with the politics of the Catholic Question. The continued existence of the Yeomanry allowed Protestants to demonstrate that their traditional control of law and order was intact as the campaign for emancipation built up. Yeomanry parades and the use of the force in assisting magistrates with mundane law and order matters assumed great symbolic importance as tangible manifestations of the fractures in Irish society. Yeomanry corps inevitably became involved in local clashes in an increasingly sectarianised atmosphere. In 1807, the government prevented Enniscorthy Yeomen celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Vinegar Hill as it raised sectarian tensions. In 1808 Yeomen were among a mob which disrupted a St John’s Eve bonfire and ‘garland’ near Newry, provoking a riot in which one man died. During the disturbances which swept Kerry and Limerick the same year, isolated Protestant Yeomen were singled out for attacks and arms raids. Since penal times, possession or dispossession of arms scored political points. Protestant insecurity and Catholic alienation fed off each other. O’Connell, ironically once a Yeoman himself, upped the ante by lambasting the force as symbolising a partisan magistracy.
The Yeomanry presented governments with a dilemma: was their strategic utility worth the political price? While war with France continued and the regular army was depleted for overseas service, they provided an important source of additional manpower and were particularly useful during invasion scares when they could free up the remaining regular garrison and maintain a local presence to deter co-ordinated action by the disaffected. Moreover, they served an unofficial purpose by keeping potentially turbulent Protestants under discipline.
The decision was deferred and the dilemma submerged. For much of the 1820s the Yeomanry lingered on, a rather moribund force seen by officials as a liability which could not be disbanded for fear of a Protestant reaction, particularly in Ulster where the force was numerically strongest. The advent of the denominationally inclusive County Constabulary in 1822 further touched Protestant insecurity by removing much of the functional justification for Yeomanry. There was no love lost between the two forces. In 1830 William McMullan of the Lurgan infantry was arrested by his own captain, yelling at the head of a mob rioting against the police, ‘we have plenty of arms and ammunition and can use them as well as you’. Ironically in that year the Whig chief secretary, Stanley, had decided to re-clothe and re-arm the Yeomanry as part of the response to the southern Tithe War. Stanley’s experiment proved disastrous as sectarian clashes developed.
In some districts the sight of a red coat was like a red rag to a bull. In 1831, the rescue of two heifers destrained for tithe sparked an appalling incident in Newtownbarry. A mob of locals tried to release the cattle, the magistrates called for Yeomanry and stones were thrown. When one Yeoman fell with a fractured skull, the others opened fire killing fourteen countrymen. The viceroy, Anglesey, tried to limit the political damage by initiating a progressive dismantling of the Yeomanry starting with a stand-down of the permanent sergeants which meant the Yeomen could no longer drill. This phasing-out took three years and was intentionally gradual, starving the Yeomanry of the oxygen of duty and pay, thus letting them pass away naturally if not gracefully. It was rightly felt this approach would be less likely to provoke a political reaction than sudden disbandment which, for a Protestant community coming to terms with emancipation, would have been like an amputation without anaesthetic.

Yeomanry belt plates – Glenauly [County Fermanagh]
Infantry and Belfast Merchant’s Crops. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

Although the Yeomanry’s official existence ended in 1834, the last rusty muskets were not removed from their dusty stores till the early 1840s. With unintentional but obvious symbolism, they were escorted to the ordnance stores by members of the new constabulary. Although gone, the Yeomen were most certainly not forgotten. For one thing, they were seen as the most recent manifestation of a tradition of Protestant self-defence stretching back to plantation requirements of armed service from tenants then re-surfacing in different forms such as the Williamite county associations, the eighteenth-century Boyne Societies, anti-Jacobite associations of 1745 and the Volunteers. Such identification had been eagerly promoted. At the foundation of an Apprentice Boys’ club in 1813, Colonel Blacker, a Yeoman and Orangeman, amalgamated the siege tradition, the Yeomanry and 1798 in a song entitled The Crimson Banner:

Again when treason maddened round,
and rebel hordes were swarming,
were Derry’s sons the foremost found,
for King and Country arming.

Moreover, the idea of a yeomanry remained as a structural template for local, gentry-led self-defence, particularly in Ulster. When volunteering was revived in Britain in 1859, northern Irish MPs like Sharman Crawford tried unsuccessfully to use the Yeomanry precedent to get similar Irish legislation. Yeomanry-like associations were mooted in the second Home Rule crisis of 1893. The Ulster Volunteer Force of 1911-14—often led by the same families like Knox of Dungannon—defined their role like Yeomen, giving priority to local defence and exhibiting great reluctance to leave their own districts for training in brigades.
The strong Orange-Yeomanry connection—itself part of a wider process of militarisation in Irish society—has left an enduring imprint on Orangeism which can be seen in the marching fife and drum bands and in various military regalia such as ceremonial swords and pikes. Even the name is still retained by the Moira Yeomanry Loyal Orange Lodge. The town or parish basis of Yeomanry corps mirrored the dynamics of the plantations and helped catapult the territorial mind-set of both ‘planter’ and ‘native’ into the nineteenth century and beyond. Weekly Yeomanry parades defined territory in the same way as rural drumming parties in the nineteenth century and marches, murals and coloured kerbstones in the twentieth.

Alan Blackstock works in the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland.

The formation of the Orange Order, 1795-98: the edited papers of Colonel William Blacker and Colonel Robert H. Wallace (Belfast 1994).

T. Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation (Dublin 1992).

G. Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36 (London 1970).

H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836 (London and Toronto 1966).


Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796 - History

This is a finding aid. It is a description of archival material held in the Wilson Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Unless otherwise noted, the materials described below are physically available in our reading room, and not digitally available through the World Wide Web. See the Duplication Policy section for more information.

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Size 1.0 feet of linear shelf space (approximately 372 items)
Abstract Edmund Walter Jones (1811-1876) was a planter at Clover Hill in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Early items in the collection are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law, William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport (b. 1839), John Thomas (1842-1864) and Walter L. (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator. Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.
Creator Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
Language English
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The following terms from Library of Congress Subject Headings suggest topics, persons, geography, etc. interspersed through the entire collection the terms do not usually represent discrete and easily identifiable portions of the collection--such as folders or items.

Clicking on a subject heading below will take you into the University Library's online catalog.

  • Avery family.
  • Bounties, Military--United States--History--Mexican War, 1846-1848.
  • Clover Hill Plantation (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • College students--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Confederate States of America. Army--Military life.
  • Confederate States of America. Army. North Carolina Infantry Regiment, 26th.
  • Davenport, William, fl. 1789-1821.
  • Family--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Happy Valley (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • Jones family.
  • Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1771-1844.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1848-1920.
  • Jones, John Thomas, 1842-1864.
  • Jones, Walter L., d. 1863.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Lawyers--North Carolina--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir (N.C.)--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir family.
  • North Carolina--Boundaries--Tennessee.
  • North Carolina--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.
  • North Carolina--Politics and government--1865-1950.
  • Patterson family.
  • Plantations--North Carolina--Caldwell County.
  • Real estate investment--United States--History--19th century.
  • Soldiers--Confederate States of America--Correspondence.
  • Southern States--Description and travel.
  • Surveyors--North Carolina--History.
  • Tennessee--Boundaries--North Carolina.
  • University of North Carolina (1793-1962)--Students--History--19th century.
  • Virginia--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.

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Edmund Walter Jones of Clover Hill, situated about six miles north of Lenoir in Caldwell County, N.C., was the son of Edmund Jones and his wife Ann Lenoir Jones of Palmyra. His grandfathers were William Lenoir and George Jones. Edmund Walter Jones married his cousin Sophia Caroline Davenport, daughter of William Davenport and his wife Mary Lenoir Gordon Davenport of The Fountain (or Walnut Fountain). All of these homes were located in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Edmund Walter and Sophia Jones had four sons and one daughter: Colonel John T. Jones, who was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness on 6 May 1864 Private Walter L. Jones, who was mortally wounded at Gettysburg Captain William Davenport Jones, a member of General Collet Leventhorpe's staff who was also wounded and Edmund Jones, legislator and lawyer. Colonel John Thomas Jones served in the 1st North Carolina Volunteers and then as an officer in the 26th North Carolina Regiment under Zebulon B. Vance and Henry K. Burgwyn, and in the brigade of James Johnston Pettigrew. He was a lieutenant colonel when he was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness. Walter L. Jones attended Hillsboro Military Academy in 1860, became a soldier, and was killed at Gettysburg. Edmund Jones (1848-1920), called Edmund Jones, Jr. and nicknamed Coot, studied at Bingham Academy, served briefly in the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry in 1865, and after the war studied at the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia. In later years, he farmed at Clover Hill, practiced law in Lenoir, and served in the N.C. legislature.

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The earlier papers are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest and wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport Jones, John Thomas Jones (1842-1864) and Walter L. Jones (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund Jones (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, N.C., lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator.

Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill Plantation and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.


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